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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present a theory of the financing of investment in a modern capitalist 
economy, following the approach developed by Hyman P. Minsky. We argue that the 
current financial crisis that began with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in 
the United States in 2007 provides a compelling reason to show how his approach offers 
us a grounding in the workings of financial capitalism. Even if the spreading global 
financial crisis is successfully contained this time around, it is likely that analyses will 
incorporate a substantial dose of Minsky’s ideas for many years to come. What we 
present is an alternative to the standard approach that was developed beginning in the 
early 1970s, based on the “efficient markets hypothesis” that relegates money and finance 
to the sidelines. Minsky vehemently denied the relevance of such a theory, at least for a 
modern capitalist economy with complex, expensive, and long-lived capital assets. In our 
kind of economy, the method used to finance positions in assets is of critical importance, 
both for theory and for real-world outcomes. In the first section we present the 
investment theory of the business cycle developed by John Maynard Keynes, and then 
examine Minsky’s extension that added a financial theory of investment. This allowed 
Minsky to analyze the evolution, over time, of the modern capitalist economy toward 
fragility—what is well known as Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. In the 
subsequent section, we update Minsky’s approach to finance with a more detailed 
examination of asset pricing and of the evolution of the banking sector. In the final 
section we briefly review the insights that such an approach can provide for analysis of 
the current global financial crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we will present a theory of the financing of investment in a modern 
capitalist economy. Our exposition will closely follow the approach developed by Hyman 
Minsky, arguably the most important contributor to our understanding of this topic. 
While Minsky began his research in the 1950s and continued to refine his theory until his 
death in 1996, his approach has been largely ignored by the mainstream of the profession, 
even though the inclusion of some of his ideas in models similar to the New Consensus 
provides relevant insights (Lavoie 2008; Weise and Barbera 2008). This does not mean 
that his work was unknown, as it was long embraced by Post Keynesian economists and 
by Wall Street practitioners who recognized the real-world relevance of Minsky’s 
arguments. Indeed, a few conventional economists—including some Nobel laureates 
(some of whom were personal friends of Minsky)—were influenced by his ideas. Still, as 
we prepare this paper, there is little doubt that interest in his theory is at an all-time peak 
(e.g., McCulley 2007; Chancellor 2007; Lahart 2007). Indeed, the current financial crisis 
that began with a collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the United States in 2007 
provides a compelling reason to show how his approach provides us with a grounding in 
the workings of financial capitalism. Even if the spreading global financial crisis is 
successfully contained this time around, it is likely that analyses will incorporate a 
substantial dose of Minsky’s ideas for many years to come. 
  It should be noted that what we present here is an alternative to the standard 
approach that was developed from the early 1970s, based on the “efficient markets 
hypothesis.” We will not develop a detailed treatment of that theory here. Like all 
approaches derived from the old neoclassical theory, it relegates money and finance to 
the sidelines. As basic macroeconomics presented in the mainstream principles textbooks 
teaches, neoclassical theory presumes “money neutrality”—the notion that at least in the 
long run, money only determines nominal prices. Various devices have been posited to 
allow money to have short-run “real” effects on relative prices, real output, levels of 
employment, or the composition of output. However, the market is continually striving to 
eliminate these non-neutralities as it seeks market clearing equilibria consistent with 
tastes and technologies. The primary barrier preventing market clearing is, of course, the   3
government. The efficient markets hypothesis extends the analysis to alternative methods 
of financing activity. Whereas Milton Friedman had famously argued that good 
neoclassical analysis might as well assume that money is dropped from helicopters, 
orthodox finance theory tried to show that shedding that assumption would make little 
difference. Whether productive activity is financed by retained earnings, debt, or equity 
would, on the basis of “rigorous” assumptions, be irrelevant for “real” outcomes. As one 
orthodox (New Keynesian) economist puts it: “prior to the introduction of informational 
asymmetries, the framework resembles a simple real business cycle model; financial 
structure is irrelevant” (Gertler 1988: 581). 
  Minsky vehemently denied the relevance of such theory, at least for the modern 
capitalist economy with complex, expensive, and long-lived capital assets. In our kind of 
economy, money can never be neutral—not in the short run nor even in the long run. The 
method used to finance positions in assets is of critical importance both for theory, as 
well as for real world outcomes. In particular, use of debt sets up a stream of obligations 
that must be fulfilled to maintain solvency. The problem is that at the time these 
commitments are made, neither party to the agreement can be sure that the contract for 
future payment will be fulfilled. Further, failure by one party to meet contractual 
payments can cause financial distress for the party expecting to receive payment. For this 
reason, one default can generate a snowball of defaults, as creditors holding bad debts fail 
to make good on their own debts. As defaults spread, the value of financial assets falls—
since every financial asset represents a claim on an income stream or on cash expected 
from the sale of an underlying asset. As such, the value of each financial asset depends on 
the expected payments, which, if not forthcoming, causes asset values to fall.  
  Thus, if an unconstrained snowball of defaults affects asset prices generally, what 
Irving Fisher called a “debt deflation” can take hold. Both Fisher and Minsky believed 
that such a process occurred during the 1930s, and that this is what made the Great 
Depression so severe. It must be emphasized that mainstream theory rules out of 
existence such processes and argues in any case that deflation helps the economy by 
increasing real balances (and Friedman [1969] went as far as to argue that permanent 
deflation should be sought by central banks). As Goodhart and Tsomocos (2007) argue, 
“rigorous” mainstream theory assumes that defaults never occur, meaning that deflation   4
cannot generate a financial crisis when debtors find the real burden of debt rising because 
nominal prices and incomes are falling. However, Minsky and Fisher argued this is 
precisely what made the Great Depression so bad. By ignoring default, mainstream 
economists such as Friedman can claim that financial crises are solely due to policy 
mistakes, not to any fundamental forces operating in modern economies. For this reason, 
Minsky argued that mainstream theory is irrelevant and even dangerous if it is applied to 
the world in which we actually live. 
  In the next section we present the investment theory of the business cycle 
developed by J.M. Keynes, and then examine Minsky’s extension of that theory, which 
added a financial theory of investment. This allowed Minsky to analyze the evolution of 
the modern capitalist economy over time. Indeed, the financial theory of investment plays 
a crucial role in Minsky’s hypothesis that financially complex economies tend toward 
fragility—what is well-known as Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. In the 
subsequent section, we update Minsky’s approach to finance with a more detailed 
examination of asset pricing and of the evolution of the banking sector. In the final 
section we briefly review the insights that such an approach can provide for analysis of 
the current global financial crisis. 
 
THE INVESTMENT THEORY OF THE CYCLE AND MINSKY’S FINANCIAL 
THEORY OF INVESTMENT 
 
Keynes’s General Theory gave a central role to the investment decision in the 
determination of the aggregate level of effective demand, which, in turn, is the primary 
factor generating the equilibrium level of employment and output. As the undergraduate 
textbooks put it, investment is the driving variable that operates through a multiplier to 
establish total income. The size of the multiplier is rather mechanically calculated as the 
inverse of the marginal propensity to save, although more complicated expositions can 
take account of leakages to imports and taxes.
1 Hence, an increase of investment causes 
income and, thus, consumption to rise until saving rises to equality with the new level of 
                                                 
1 More formally, ∆Y/∆I = 1/(1 – b(1 – t) + j) with Y the level of national income, I the level of aggregate 
investment, b the marginal propensity to consume, t the income tax rate, and j the marginal propensity to 
import.   5
investment. The level of investment is a function of the marginal efficiency of capital 
(essentially the discounted future profits) weighed against the market interest rate, which 
equilibrates the supply of and demand for money. When the marginal efficiency of 
capital is above “the” market interest rate, investment is undertaken, raising income, 
output, and employment through the spending multiplier. This proceeds until the 
marginal efficiency of capital falls, the interest rate rises, or some combination of the two 
eliminates the gap. As soon as the marginal efficiency of capital equals the interest rate, 
there is no advantage to investing so the economy returns to equilibrium.   
  While such an exposition can be found in Keynes’s book, this caricature does not 
come close to capturing Keynes’s theory of investment. To really understand Keynes’s 
theory, one must turn to chapter 17 of the General Theory—a rather complex exposition 
that is normally avoided by all but the most serious of his followers. In that chapter, the 
investment decision is incorporated within his liquidity preference theory of asset prices, 
or, to put it another way, his theory of “own rates.” He argued that “for every durable 
commodity we have a rate of interest in terms of itself—a wheat-rate of interest, a 
copper-rate of interest, a house-rate of interest, even a steel-plant-rate of interest” 
(Keynes 2007: 222–223). Each of these own rates can be stated in terms of money, which 
typically carries the “greatest of the own-rates, hence, ‘rules the roost’ because money 
has special, peculiar properties”
2 (Keynes 2007: 223; see also Kregel [1997]). The 
expected return on holding any asset measured in monetary terms is q-c+l+a, where q is 
the asset’s expected yield, c is carrying costs, l is liquidity, and a is expected price 
appreciation (or depreciation). The total return is used to calculate a marginal efficiency 
for each asset, including money. The composition of returns varies by asset, with most of 
the return to illiquid assets (such as capital) consisting of q-c, while most of the return to 
holding liquid assets consists of the (subjectively evaluated) l. Finally, changing 
                                                 
2 According to Keynes, money has three special properties. It has a near zero elasticity of substitution, 
which means that when the demand for money rises, there is little substitution into alternative assets. It also 
has a near zero elasticity of production, which means that when the demand for money rises, labor does not 
get diverted to its production (since labor is not required to produce money because it is neither mined like 
a metal nor grown like a crop). Finally, the carrying cost of money is negligible—money doesn’t spoil (like 
food), doesn’t depreciate with use (like a machine), and doesn’t entail huge storage costs (most money 
today takes the form of electrical charges on computer tapes, but even paper money is relatively cheap to 
store). For these reasons, an increased demand for money can become a “bottomless sink” of purchasing 
power.   6
expectations differentially impact marginal efficiencies of different kinds of assets, 
depending on the composition of the returns. Increased confidence about future economic 
performance will raise the qs on capital assets while lowering the subjective values 
assigned to liquid positions (hence, the l falls), so the marginal efficiency of capital rises 
relative to that of assets that get much of their return from l. In that case, capital assets 
will be produced (investment rises, inducing the “multiplier” impact) and the full range of 
asset prices adjusts. Thus, expectations about the future go into determining the 
equilibrium level of output and employment.  
  For example, if entrepreneurs expect that future demand for widgets will be 
higher, they might expect more profits in that line of business. This raises the marginal 
efficiency of widget-making machines and, if this exceeds the expected returns on all 
other assets that can be held, they will want to order the production of widget-making 
machines today. Production of the widget-making machines will provide wages to 
workers and revenues to those firms when the machines are sold. Workers in turn will 
spend their incomes, inducing a “multiplier” impact on aggregate demand, leading to 
more employment. Some of the extra income generated will be spent on widgets, 
validating the expectations that led to the production of the widget-making machines. Of 
course, there will also be increased consumption of other kinds of output that could raise 
profit expectations in other lines of business, inducing even more investment in other 
types of machines. Logically, investment, employment, output, and consumption can 
continue to grow through this process until there is no marginal efficiency of any type of 
machine that exceeds the expected return on liquid, financial assets. Finally, we can see 
that the whole process of growth can be reversed if the expected returns of capital assets 
(the q less the c plus any a, as discussed above) fall or if the expected return to liquid 
assets (the l described above) rises.   
  Thus, we can see that Keynes’s liquidity preference theory of asset prices is 
inextricably linked to the theory of the multiplier and, thus, the theory of effective 
demand. Only if the marginal efficiency of some asset that can be produced using labor 
(plant, capital equipment, commercial and residential buildings, private infrastructure)   7
exceeds the marginal efficiency on money will investment take place.
3 This then raises 
effective demand through the multiplier. The new equilibrium level of effective demand 
(and, hence, of employment, income, and output) will be reached when all own rates are 
equal to the standard set by money’s return.
4  
  Minsky believed that Keynes’s investment theory of the cycle is incomplete 
because it does not really analyze how investment is financed when the marginal 
efficiency of some capital asset exceeds the marginal efficiency of money. There seems 
to be an implicit assumption in the General Theory that the investment project will get 
funded. While Keynes did deal with this in a bit more detail in several publications after 
1936, most of his effort went toward explaining why saving cannot be a source of 
finance. Hence, Minsky’s most important contribution was to add the “financial theory of 
investment” to Keynes’s “investment theory of the cycle.” Figure 1 provides a graphical 
illustration of Minsky’s theory. The two key building blocks are the “two-price system” 
and the “lender’s and borrower’s risk.” Following Keynes, Minsky distinguished between 
a price system for current output and one for asset prices. Current output prices can be 
taken as determined by “cost plus mark-up,” set at a level that will generate profits so 
long as the administered price can be maintained with adequate sales. Current output 
covers consumer goods and services, investment goods and services, exports, and even 
goods and services purchased by government.  
                                                 
3 Orthodox interpretations of Keynes present this very simplistically as a relation between “the” interest 
rate and the marginal efficiency of capital. In his chapter 17, Keynes insisted that there are as many “own 
rates of interest” as there are assets. Hence, the comparison is not simply between one return to capital and 
one interest rate, but rather across a whole spectrum of expected returns on assets, with different 
components (q-c+l+a) making up the returns. 
4 We want to emphasize here that Keynes’s notion of equilibrium is not the same as that used in orthodox 
analysis. For Keynes, equilibrium implies a “state of rest” in which there is no further inducement to 
change one’s behavior (in this case, a position in which firms are satisfied with the level of investment and 
of employment and production); it does not imply that all markets have cleared. Most importantly, 
Keynes’s notion of equilibrium does not imply full employment of labor resources, which is the key 
implication of the orthodox identification of equilibrium as simultaneous clearing of all markets since 
involuntary unemployment is ruled out by assumption. Note also that for Keynes, equilibrium is a device 
used to analyze the forces that determine the aggregate levels of income, employment, and output, as well 
as the prices of assets. There is no expectation that we will ever observe a “state of rest” in the real world. 
This is why Keynes’s chapter 12, which is chock full of colorful analogies—such as “whirlwinds of 
speculation”—is so important. Expectations play a critical role in determining asset prices (thus, also in 
determining effective demand) and these are liable to disappointment and to fluctuation. Thus, even if we 
ever achieved a position in which every member of the economy were satisfied with her portfolio of assets, 
it would be a fleeting instant. Attempts to adjust portfolios cause asset prices to change, which generates 
shifts of spending and employment from one sector to another, and also affects the total levels of spending 
and employment (Kregel 1976, 1986).   8














  In the case of investment goods, the current output price is effectively a supply 
price of capital—the price just sufficient to induce a supplier to provide new capital 
assets (PI). However, this simplified analysis can be applied only to purchases of capital 
that can be financed out of internal funds (such as sales revenue from on-going 
operations). If external (borrowed) funds are needed, then the supply price of capital also 
includes explicit finance costs—most importantly the interest rate, but also all other fees 
and costs—that is, total supply price (PIs in Figure 1) rises above the price administered 
by suppliers (PI) due to “lender’s risk” that is covered by the finance costs of borrowed 
funds. In Figure 1, this is represented by an upward slope in the PI-curve once investment 
is expected to require external funds. The quantity of investment goods that is expected to 
be purchased by using expected internal funds is given by the distance from the origin to 
OIF, while the external funds are equal to the distance from OIF to OId.  
  There is a second price system for assets that can be held through time. Assets 
include capital assets, financial assets, and money—essentially anything that can be held 
through time as a store of nominal wealth. Except for money (the most liquid asset), these 
assets are expected to generate a stream of income and possibly capital gains.
5 Here, 
Minsky follows Keynes’s treatment in chapter 17 described above. The important point is 
                                                 
5 Currency does not pay interest, so it does not generate any q. Other forms of money, including bank 
demand deposits, might pay a small interest rate (hence, q is above zero); what is important is that liquid 
assets, such as money of all types, are expected to pay lower yields than more illiquid assets, such as 
corporate bonds or capital assets. Hence, where exactly we draw the dividing line between “money” and 
other types of assets is not important for this analysis. We can think of a spectrum of liquidity, with 
currency at one end and factories with machinery at the other end. 
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that the prospective income stream cannot be known with certainty, thus it depends on 
subjective expectations. By taking the price of old capital assets (PK) as a point of 
reference, we obtain a demand price for new capital assets (PId) from this asset price 
system: how much would one pay for the asset, given expectations concerning the future 
net revenues that it can generate? 
  Again, however, this is too simplistic because it ignores the financing 
arrangements. Minsky argued that the price one is willing to pay depends on the amount 
of external finance required—greater borrowing exposes the buyer to higher risk of 
insolvency. This is why “borrower’s risk” must also be incorporated into demand prices. 
Unlike lender’s risk, this “cost” is solely subjectively determined and is not written into 
any contracts. One can think of it as a “margin of safety”: if one expects an asset to 
generate a stream of returns with a discounted value equal to $1 million, one would not 
be willing to pay more than $750,000 for the asset. The margin of safety provides a 
cushion ($250,000 in this case) to ensure that debt contracts created to finance the 
position in the asset can be serviced even if revenues turn out to be less than expected. 
That way, one will avoid bankruptcy unless the margin of safety proves to be too small. 
Obviously, there is no hard and fast rule governing the appropriate margin of safety 
because the borrower’s risk cannot be calculated precisely for a future that is yet to 
unfold.  
  The quantity of investment goods purchased (OId) is determined where PId = PIs, 
not when PK = PI.
6 The latter case is the explanation of investment developed by Tobin 
(1969). Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of existing capital assets (PK) to their 
replacement cost (PI). If q > 1, it is cheaper for companies to buy new capital assets, i.e., 
to invest rather than to buy existing capital assets (through mergers, acquisitions, or other 
means). If q < 1, investment declines as it is less costly to buy existing capital assets, so 
firms don’t order new capital. However, Tobin’s q assumes away the importance of 
uncertainty and funding structure for the determination of investment. Note that in 
Minsky’s version, the demand price declines with level of investment demand, whereas 
the supply price increases with investment. This is due to Kalecki’s principle of 
                                                 
6 Note that if these two curves are horizontal (no lender’s or borrower’s risk), then there is no intersection 
unless they lie on top of one another. For all other situations, investment would be either infinite or 
nonexistent.    10
increasing risk, which states that, given expected internal funds and given conventions 
about the appropriate leverage ratio, entrepreneurs and bankers assume that it is more and 
more risky to invest as the expected level of external funding increases. Thus, as the level 
of investment increases above OIF, entrepreneurs become less willing to invest (the 
demand price declines as borrower’s risk increases) and bankers become more and more 
stringent as external funding increases (the supply price increases as the lender’s risk 
increases). 
  Investment can proceed only if the demand price (adjusted for borrower’s risk) 
exceeds the supply price (adjusted for lender’s risk) of capital assets. Because these 
prices include margins of safety, they are affected by expectations concerning 
unknowable outcomes. In the beginning of a recovery from a severe recession, margins 
are large as expectations are pessimistic; over time, if an expansion generates returns that 
exceed the projections, then these margins prove to be larger than necessary. This leads to 
a reduction in the perceived borrower’s risk and lender’s risk, which generates flatter PId 
and PIs curves and so increases the demand for investment goods. This, in turn, means 
that, given the expected flow of internal funds, bankers and entrepreneurs expect and 
accept a higher proportion of external funding and greater investment. Thus, margins will 
be reduced to the degree that projects are generally successful.  
  Minsky created a famous taxonomy of financing profiles undertaken by investing 
firms: hedge (prospective income flows are expected to cover interest and principle with 
a safe margin); speculative (near-term income flows will cover only interest, although it 
is expected that finance costs will fall, that income flows will rise, or that assets can be 
sold at a higher price later—in which case revenues will be sufficient to cover principle); 
and Ponzi (near-term receipts are insufficient to cover interest payments so that debt 
increases because the Ponzi unit borrows to cover interest payments). Over the course of 
an expansion, financial stances evolve from largely hedge to include ever rising 
proportions of speculative and even Ponzi positions. Some Ponzi positions are undertaken 
voluntarily (due, for example, to expectations that debt can be refinanced at much more 
favorable terms or that large capital gains can be realized from asset price appreciation), 
some are fraudulent (a “pyramid” scheme is an example, in which a crook dupes ever-
larger numbers of suckers to provide the funds to pay the earliest participants), and some   11
result from disappointment (revenues are lower than expected or finance costs rise 
unexpectedly). 
  Attempts to raise leverage and to move to more speculative positions can be 
frustrated at least temporarily: if results turn out to be more favorable than expected, an 
investor attempting to engage in speculative finance could remain hedge because incomes 
realized are greater than were anticipated. This is because as aggregate investment rises, 
it has a multiplier impact on effective demand that can raise sales beyond what had been 
expected. Later, Minsky explicitly incorporated the Kaleckian result that in the truncated 
model, aggregate profits equal investment plus the government’s deficit.
7 Thus, in an 
investment boom, profits would be increasing along with investment, helping to validate 
expectations and encouraging even more investment. This added strength to his 
proposition that the fundamental instability in the capitalist economy is upward—toward 
a speculative frenzy (as investment generates profits), which breeds more investment.  
  In addition, in the early 1960s, he had argued that impacts on private-sector 
balance sheets would depend on the stance of the government’s balance sheet (Minsky 
1963). A government spending–led expansion would allow the private sector to expand 
without creating fragile balance sheets—government deficits would add safe treasury 
debt to private portfolios even as it raised profits (through the expanded version of the 
Kalecki equation), and income and employment through the “government spending 
multiplier.”
8 A robust expansion, however, would tend to cause revenues from 
progressive income taxes to grow faster than private-sector income so that the 
government budget would “improve” (move toward surplus) and the private-sector 
                                                 
7 Following national accounting identities one has: 
 
W + П + T ≡ C + I + G + X – J 
 
with Π the gross profit of firms after corporate tax, W employees’ disposable wage income, T taxes, C the 
consumption level (of capitalists and workers), I the level of investment, G the level of government 
spending, X exports, and J imports. Subtracting W and T from each side and defining CC the consumption 
of capitalists (so that consumption is divided between capitalist consumption and worker consumption out 
of wages, CW) one gets: 
Π = CC – SW + I + DEF + NX 
 
with SW the saving level of wage earners (SW = W – CW), DEF the government fiscal deficit, and NX net 
exports. Kalecki (1971: 78–79) derived a causal relation out of the identity (thus transforming the identity 
into an equality) by arguing that Π is not under the control of firms, whereas variables on the right side 
depend on discretionary choices. 
8 The government spending multiplier is exactly analogous to the investment spending multiplier.   12
balance would deteriorate (move toward deficit). Once he added the Kalecki equation to 
his exposition, he could also explain how this countercyclical movement of the budget 
would automatically stabilize profits—limiting both the upside in a boom (profits are 
squeezed by a declining budget deficit) and the downside in a slump (profits are boosted 
by growing budget deficits). 
  Further, with the Kalecki view of profits incorporated in his investment theory of 
the cycle, Minsky argued that investment is forthcoming today only if investment is 
expected in the future—since investment in the future will determine profits in the future 
(in the skeletal model). Because investment today produces profits to validate the 
decisions undertaken “yesterday” to invest, expectations about “tomorrow” affect ability 
to meet commitments that were made “yesterday” when financing the existing capital 
assets. While this might sound complicated, it just means that firms need to obtain profits 
“today” to satisfy the expectations they held in the past when they purchased capital; 
however, profits “today” will be lower if firms are not investing now (perhaps because 
they are pessimistic about the future). So to validate the decisions made in the past, we 
need investment today that in turn depends on expectations about “tomorrow.” There is 
thus a complex temporal relation involved in Minsky’s approach to investment that could 
be easily disturbed. By linking this to the “two-price” approach described above, Minsky 
made it clear that anything that lowers expected future profitability can push today’s 
demand price of capital below the supply price, reducing investment and today’s profits 
below the level necessary to validate past expectations on which demand prices were 
based when previous capital projects were undertaken. This also means that the margins 
of safety that had been included in borrower’s and lender’s risk can prove to be 
inadequate, leading to revisions of desired margins of safety going forward. As margins 
rise due to disappointments, the demand price of capital falls below its supply price 
(appropriately adjusted for lender’s and borrower’s risk), leading to less investment and, 
through the multiplier, to still lower output and employment. The economy can spiral 
ever downward into a deepening recession. 
  Minsky continually improved his approach to banking and finance, recognizing 
the futility of Fed attempts to control the money supply. This is because banks would try 
to avoid and evade constraints imposed by the Fed in order to obtain the profits available   13
from providing finance to firms. He also expanded the analysis so that all entities were 
treated like banks, acquiring assets by issuing liabilities. He argued that anyone could 
create money; the problem was to get it accepted (Minsky 1986: 69). He argued that 
while the Fed had been created to act as lender of last resort, making business debt liquid 
(by lending against it), the Fed no longer discounted paper (Minsky 1986: 47). Indeed, 
most reserves supplied by the Fed come through open market operations, which greatly 
restricts the Fed’s ability to ensure the safety and soundness of the system by deciding 
which collateral to accept, and by taking a close look at balance sheets of borrowers. 
Instead, during the late 1970s through much of the 1980s, the Fed had come to rely on 
Friedman’s simplistic monetarist view that the primary role of the Fed is to “control” the 
money supply and thereby the economy as a whole
9—which it cannot do, as attempts to 
constrain reserves only induce innovative bank practices and encourage expansion of 
“non-bank” sources of finance, ultimately requiring lender of last resort interventions and 
even bail-outs that validate riskier practices (Minsky 1986: 94). Minsky believed that 
such interventions are necessary, but that they then encourage even more innovations that 
increase fragility. Together with countercyclical deficits to maintain demand, lender of 
last resort policy not only prevents deep recession, but also creates a chronic bias toward 
speculatory booms by market participants that believe government intervention will 
always bail them out. 
 
EXTENDING MINSKY: ASSET PRICES AND FINANCE 
 
Asset prices play a crucial role in the determination of the investment level because the 
latter depends on a double arbitrage. On the one hand, following the logic of Keynes’s 
chapter 17 presented above, it is assumed that capitalists make arbitrages among all types 
of assets (financial and capital assets) in order to get what is expected to be the greatest 
monetary return, given liquidity, maturity, and risk concerns. Contrary to the monetarist 
view, however, this does not mean that all assets are perfectly substitutable—the gross 
                                                 
9 Friedman argued that money is the primary driving variable of nominal output; if the central bank would 
keep money growth constant, nominal GDP growth would also be stabilized. This led to his famous money 
rule: target money growth at some low and stable rate (such as 4% per year), which the central bank could 
supposedly achieve by restraining growth of bank reserves.   14
substitution axiom does not hold—because the logic of capitalism and uncertainty creates 
a preference for money and its close substitutes since they are liquid. Capitalism rewards 
economic activities that generate a high monetary return and higher uncertainty lowers 
the qs and increase the ls as described earlier.
10 On the other hand, there is an arbitrage 
between old capital assets (i.e., existing capital equipment) and new capital assets (i.e., 
investment goods to be newly produced), and so those existing assets matter because low 
prices for existing assets can depress production of new assets.  
  The price of existing capital equipment is determined indirectly by the market 
quotation of shares and bonds of the owning firms, and by the price at which mergers and 
acquisitions are settled. Aside from making a difference between marginal productivity 
theory and liquidity preference theory, one may classify the literature on asset pricing 
according to the assumed behaviors of individuals. This latter classification implies 
making a distinction among the rational, irrational, and convention approaches to asset 
pricing. The first two of these are adopted by most analysts, while the third is more 
consistent with the views of Keynes and Minsky. Some authors would say that q, c, l, and 
a are determined by “rational” individuals who use the guidance of a priori 
fundamentals. This theory is closely associated with the efficient market theory and 
requires that informational problems exist (asymmetric information, lack of 
computational power, or other problems) in order to explain the emergence of bubbles 
and over-investment. Otherwise, according to the rational view, information is optimally 
used, so asset prices are always at their fundamental value and the level of investment is 
always at its optimal value: “the primary role of the capital market is allocation of 
ownership of the economy’s capital stock [. It is] […] a market in which prices provide 
accurate signals for resource allocation” (Fama 1970: 383). The irrational approach 
argues that asset pricing is mostly done by individuals who show little concern for the 
existing a priori fundamentals. For some of the followers of this approach (the behavioral 
finance camp), this is a behavioral anomaly, but for others (e.g., J.K. Galbraith) it is a 
                                                 
10 According to neoclassical theory, capital earns a return equal to its marginal productivity—a physical, 
technologically determined output. Keynes and Minsky reject this relation, arguing that in a capitalist 
economy what is important is the monetary return; that is, the expected money profits to be generated by 
owning and operating capital assets. According to Keynes, the productivity theory of asset pricing only 
applies to a cooperative economy—and, as Keynes argued, this is one in which money might exist, but it 
doesn’t matter.   15
normal behavior (albeit irrational). In any case, irrational behaviors are believed to 
generate waves of panics and bubbles, which lead to periods of over- and under-
investment. The rational and irrational approaches have been used extensively in the 
mainstream literature (mostly in conjunction with the productivity theory of asset pricing) 
and do provide some insights, but they miss some important points developed in chapter 
12 of Keynes’s General Theory.  
  As Keynes notes, asset pricing depends on “a conventional valuation which is 
established as the outcome of the mass psychology of a large number of ignorant 
individuals” and “this behaviour is not the outcome of a wrong-headed propensity” 
(Keynes 2007: 154–155). In this third theory of asset pricing, the convention theory, there 
are no a priori fundamentals toward which asset prices will tend inexorably. Individuals 
are ignorant, not because they do not know how to behave rationally, but because the 
future is not written in stone; it is fundamentally uncertain. In order to reduce ignorance 
about an unknowable future, fundamentals are created through social interactions in order 
to provide a vision of the future that justifies current decisions. This has two main 
implications. First, as in the irrational approach, there can be a self-fulfilling process in 
which the socially established fundamental value tends toward existing asset prices—
whatever prices are, individuals accept them as (in some sense) natural. Second, current 
decisions may lead to the concretization of the future contained in the convention—there 
may be a self-fulfilling process as the conventions cause individuals to behave in a 
manner such that the future unfolds as expected.  
  In conformity with Keynes, Minsky applied the convention approach (explicated 
in Keynes’s chapter 12) to the liquidity preference theory of asset price (from Keynes’s 
chapter 17) and noted that conventional behaviors and liquidity preference go hand in 
hand in an uncertain world that rewards monetary accumulation. A rational approach to 
the liquidity preference theory of asset prices (as in Tobin [1958]) applies only in a world 
without uncertainty; and an irrational approach to the same theory (Galbraith 1961) may 
apply only during the periods of frenzy and panic. One may wonder what the convention 
approach to the liquidity preference theory of asset prices looks like. Among the most 
recent authors, Wray (1992) and Orléan (1999) provide the foundation for such an 
approach to asset pricing. The market price of assets, as determined by q, c, l, and a, is   16
compared to a normal price, which provides an anchor for economic units. The normal 
price is socially determined through an imitation process that rests, not on following the 
previous behavior of individuals (irrational approach, cascade of information theory), but 
on anticipating the average opinion regarding the appropriate market price—as in 
Keynes’s famous “beauty contest.” Hence, the convention of a normal price provides an 
alternative to “inherent” fundamentals in determining expectations of price movements. 
If individuals in a market expect that structural changes have created an environment in 
which the “normal price” should be much higher (as they did for NASDAQ stocks during 
the new economy boom of the late 1990s or for real estate during the boom of the early 
2000s), then a speculative boom can follow—justifying the expectations and fueling 
more euphoria. 
  Aside from the theory of asset pricing, there have been developments in the 
financial system in the 1980s and 1990s that must be incorporated within the financial 
theory of investment. Minsky conceived his theory mostly in a compartmentalized 
financial system in which banks followed a commitment model to banking business. 
Within banks, there are two well-defined desks, the loan-officer desk (whose task is to 
judge the quality of the project proposed by potential borrowers and to attenuate the 
optimism of the latter) and the position-making desk (whose task is to finance and to 
refinance the positions in assets taken by the bank). In the commitment model, the point 
of the bank is to establish a long-term relationship with borrowers based on trust and 
recurring lending agreements, and to make money based on interest rate spreads between 
deposit rates paid by banks and lending rates earned by them. This model has now been 
replaced by an originate-and-distribute banking model, and Minsky noted that today there 
are “banks without loan officers” (Minsky 1981: 15). Here, banks only originate loans 
that are then packaged and sold, as discussed in the next section. Most of the profit-
making activities have been shifted toward the position-making desk. Indeed, banks now 
make most of their profits from fees obtained from selling and servicing structured 
financial instruments (mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, etc.) 
rather than from interest rate spreads. Banks no longer look for a long-term 
individualized relationship with recurring borrowers; the relation is impersonal and 
judged in minutes through a credit-scoring method (Kregel 2008).    17
  This new banking model adds two additional novelties to the dynamics of the 
margins of safety. First, development of financial fragility proceeds at an accelerated 
pace because banks and credit-rating agencies have an incentive to overestimate 
creditworthiness in order to stimulate the distribution of structured financial instruments. 
Since they won’t hold the loans, default risk will be shifted to buyers of the instruments, 
so there are obvious incentive problems. Second, credit-enhancement techniques, like 
credit subordination, excess spread, and overcollateralization, allow structured financial 
instruments (like private-label, mortgage-backed securities) to have a tranche with an 
AAA credit rating even though it is structured on the basis of junk assets (Adelson 2006). 
Thus, a high proportion of Ponzi financing may exist from the very beginning of the 
economic expansion; that is, a prolonged period of expansion may no longer be necessary 
to explain the dynamics of margins of safety. All that is necessary is a favorable trend for 
the prices of the assets underlying the Ponzi financing process. Recent developments in 
the housing market provide a clear example of this kind of dynamic, as discussed next. 
 




Chapter 24 of Keynes’s General Theory had identified two fundamental flaws of the 
capitalist system: an inability to achieve full employment and excessive inequality. 
Minsky emphasized a third flaw implicit in Keynes’s theory: instability is a normal result 
of modern financial capitalism (Minsky 1986: 101, 250). Further, stability cannot be 
maintained—even with appropriate policy—because it changes behavior in ways that 
promote evolution toward fragility. For this reason, Minsky rejected “Keynesian” policy 
that promoted “fine-tuning” of the economy—even if policy did achieve transitory 
stability, it would set off processes to reintroduce instability. Hence, “[t]he policy 
problem is to devise institutional structures and measures that attenuate the thrust to 
inflation, unemployment, and slower improvements in the standard of living without 
increasing the likelihood of a deep depression” (Minsky 1986: 295). However, success 
                                                 
11 Note that this section draws heavily on Wray (2008).   18
could never be permanent; policy would have to continually adapt to changing 
circumstances. 
  Minsky argued that the relative stability of the post-war period had led to 
development of Money Manager Capitalism—a much more unstable version of modern 
capitalism. In a prescient paper written in 1987 (Minsky 2008), Minsky predicted the 
explosion of home-mortgage securitization that eventually led to the U.S. subprime crisis 
in 2007. Indeed, he was one of the few commentators who understood the true potential 
of securitization, or, what came to be called the “originate and distribute” model 
mentioned above. Rather than holding mortgages (and other types of loans), banks would 
simply originate the loans and then would sell them to investors, such as pension funds 
and hedge funds. In principle, all mortgages could be packaged into a variety of risk 
classes, with differential pricing to cover risk. Investors could choose the desired risk-
return trade-off. Thrifts and other regulated financial institutions would earn fee income 
for loan origination, for assessing risk, and for servicing the mortgages. Two decades 
later, Minsky’s predictions were validated with a vengeance, as securitization spread far 
beyond mortgages to include student loans, credit card debt, auto loans and leases, and a 
range of other debts. By mid-2008, many of these markets were hit with rising defaults 
far exceeding what had been expected. 
  Minsky (2008) had argued that securitization resulted from two developments. 
First, it was due to the globalization of finance, as securitization creates financial assets 
sold to foreign investors with no direct access to American real assets. Minsky argued 
that the long depression-free period that followed WWII created a global glut of managed 
money seeking returns (previous to WWII, depressions had been associated with debt 
deflations that wiped out financial wealth). Packaged securities with risk weightings 
assigned by respected rating agencies were appealing for global investors trying to 
achieve the desired proportion of dollar-denominated assets. When problems began in 
U.S. subprime securities, the financial crisis quickly spread to the rest of the world 
because these were included in many global portfolios. 
  Second, over the post-war period, the importance of banks (narrowly defined as 
financial institutions that accept deposits and make loans) was rapidly eroded in favor of 
“markets” (the bank share of all financial assets fell from around 50% in the 1950s to   19
around 25% in the 1990s). This development, itself, was encouraged by the experiment in 
monetarism (1979–82, that decimated the regulated—bank and thrift—portion of the 
sector in favor of relatively unregulated “markets,” mostly large Wall Street investment 
banks), but it was also spurred by continual erosion of the portion of the financial sphere 
that had been ceded by rules, regulations, and tradition to banks. The growth of 
competition on both sides of banking business—checkable deposits at non-bank financial 
institutions that could pay market interest rates and the rise of the commercial paper 
market that allowed firms to bypass commercial banks—squeezed the profitability of 
banking. Minsky (2008) observed that banks appear to require a spread of about 450 
basis points between interest rates earned on assets less that paid on liabilities. This 
covers the normal rate of return on capital, plus the required reserve “tax” imposed on 
banks (reserves are non-earning assets), and the costs of servicing customers.  
  On the other hand, financial markets can operate with much lower spreads 
because they are exempt from required reserve ratios, regulated capital requirements, and 
much of the costs of relationship banking. At the same time, the financial markets were 
freer from the New Deal regulations that had made financial markets safer. Not only did 
this mean that an ever-larger portion of the financial sector was free of most regulations, 
but that competition from “markets” forced policy makers to relax regulations on banks. 
As bank competitivity was damaged, firms turned directly to managed money for finance 
of activities. The managed money owned by pension and hedge funds was subject to far 
less oversight and did not have the same capacity to assess credit worthiness. Further, 
managed funds operated with far greater leverage ratios (a bank can typically leverage its 
own equity by a factor of about 10, while hedge funds operate with leverage ratios of 30 
and sometimes much more; this means they use one dollar of their own funds and borrow 
$29 to increase the size of bets). All of this greatly increased fragility of the financial 
system. In normal expansions, high corporate profits mean that firms can rely more on 
relatively safe internal funds to finance activities. However, over the expansions of the 
1990s and 2000s, firms greatly increased their use of external funds, so that debt ratios 
grew. While the 1980s are well-known for leveraged buy-outs and use of “junk bonds,” 
there was actually much more “junk” issued during the G.W. Bush expansion after 2005.   20
  By the time of the real estate boom in the United States from the mid-1990s 
through 2007 that eventually led to the subprime mortgage crisis, there was no longer any 
essential difference between a “commercial bank” and an “investment bank.” Minsky 
(1986: 45) argued that the New Deal reforms related to home finance had been spurred 
by a common belief that short-term mortgages, typically with large balloon payments, 
had contributed to the Great Depression; ironically, the “innovations” in home mortgage 
finance leading up to the speculative boom largely recreated those conditions, running the 
U.S. housing sector like a huge global casino. 
  As we write, the U.S. financial sector remains in a crisis that is spreading around 
the world. Many commentators have referred to the crisis as a “Minsky moment,” 
questioning whether we have become a “Ponzi nation” (e.g., Whalen 2008). At this point, 
we can surmise that the financial innovations of the past decade greatly expanded the 
availability of credit, which then pushed up asset prices. That, in turn, not only 
encouraged further innovation to take advantage of profit opportunities, but also fueled a 
debt frenzy and greater leveraging. The Greenspan “put” (belief that the Fed would not 
allow bad things to happen, with evidence drawn from the arranged Long Term Capital 
Management rescue, as well as the quick reduction of interest rates in the aftermath of the 
dot-com bust), plus the new operating procedures adopted by the Fed (the New Monetary 
Consensus), which include gradualism, transparency, and expectations management 
(meaning, no surprises), tipped the balance of sentiments away from fear and toward 
greed. The Clinton mid-1990s boom and the shallow 2001 recession led to a revised view 
of growth according to which expansions could be more robust without inflation and that 
recessions would be brief and relatively painless. All of this increased the appetite for 
risk, reduced risk premia, and encouraged ever more leverage. Much of the rosy analyses 
conducted during the boom relied on modern orthodox finance theory, incorporated into 
complex models of market behavior based on past experience. These models appeared to 
show that risk was systematically reduced and shifted to those best able to bear it. With 
the benefit of hindsight, we can now say that risks were neither shifted nor reduced.  
  It is no surprise that many analysts have looked back to Minsky’s writings in 
order to understand the nature of the current crisis. It is now commonplace to find 
references to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. It is also easy to find many   21
commentators blaming mainstream efficient markets theory for the complacency that led 
to the systematic underpricing of risk over the past decade. One even finds mainstream 
economists pronouncing that “stability is destabilizing”—a statement that runs contrary 
to the whole stream of neoclassical economics, which emphasizes the supposed 
equilibrium-seeking nature of the market economy. Minsky argued that there could be 
forms of capitalism that would tend toward a stable equilibrium, but he insisted that 
modern financial capitalism, with complex and expensive capital equipment, would tend 
toward fragility, with bouts of instability. In order to understand our form of capitalism, it 
is necessary to recognize how investment is financed and how this can generate cyclical 
behavior—that can degenerate to a debt deflation and great depression in the absence of 
government intervention and apt policy making.   22
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